Alpha Cyber

Forensic Deep Dive: Shellcode Injection via Donot an Indian APT’s Malicious XLS

Donot Team (also known as APTC35, Viceroy Tiger, or Mint Tempest) is a highly organized Advanced Persistent Threat group strongly suspected to operate with ties to the Indian state.

Alpha Cyber Research3 min readupdated 1 Apr 2026
Indian APT Donot

Donot APT: Threat Profile and Forensic Analysis of a Malicious XLS

Donot Team (also known as APTC35, Viceroy Tiger, or Mint Tempest) is a highly organized Advanced Persistent Threat group strongly suspected to operate with ties to the Indian state. Active since at least 2016, its operations are characterized by sophistication, persistence, and a clear focus on espionage aligned with regional geopolitical interests.

Targeting Scope and Motivation


Motivation: Cyber espionage and intelligence gathering for state aligned objectives.
Victimology: The group overwhelmingly targets government, military, defense, and foreign affairs ministries. They also target NGOs, diplomatic entities, and military personnel.
Geographic Focus: Historically centered on South Asia (particularly Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and individuals in the Kashmir region). Recent campaigns show an expansion into South Asian embassies located in European diplomatic entities to gather broader intelligence on international policy and communications.

Signature Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)


The group is consistent in its methods, using multiple, interchangeable components to maintain persistent access.
Initial Access: Primarily uses highly effective spear phishing emails with compelling, context specific lures (e.g., impersonating officials or referencing real diplomatic events) to trick victims into enabling macros or clicking malicious links.
Execution & Evasion: Relies heavily on macro based shellcode injection to achieve in memory execution. This technique allows the malicious payload to run directly in the memory of a legitimate process (like Excel), bypassing disk based and signature based security products.
Toolset: Utilizes custom, proprietary backdoors and remote access trojans (RATs) such as YTY and GEdit. The malicious file analyzed here is the initial dropper designed to deliver these final stage payloads.
Platform Diversity: While focusing on Windows, the group has also been observed deploying trojanized Android applications to steal mobile data, demonstrating a commitment to comprehensive intelligence collection.

Forensic Analysis: The Malicious XLSX Dropper

The file analyzed is a classic example of a Donot APT delivery mechanism, using an old OLE format (.xls) to host an obfuscated macro designed for shellcode execution.

File Summary

AttributeValueImplication
File Hash683516912ba44027a1d5121d53f176e0ac12f24d6e7c135d5138fbcd9e4c71e4.xlsUnique identifier (IOC).
File TypeOLE (Old Binary Format)Contains active VBA macro code capable of executing native Windows functions.
VerdictMalware (Downloader/Dropper)The file’s sole purpose is to compromise the host and install a secondary payload.


VBA Code Analysis: Evasion Techniques

The macro found in the ThisWorkbook.cls stream utilizes several techniques to hide its intent and bypass detection:

Obfuscation:
Randomized Names: All functions and variables are assigned meaningless, randomized names (e.g., lijlJliiiLIijILL, llJJIlJILlllljiL) to confuse analysts and automated tools.
Hexadecimal Shellcode Array: The actual malicious code is stored as a massive byte array of hexadecimal values (jijjLLlLiLJLlJli(1 0) = &H90:). This avoids placing suspicious executable strings in the macro’s source code.
Compatibility: Inclusion of If VBA7 Then directives shows a deliberate effort to ensure the macro runs successfully across both 32bit and 64bit Office environments.

Execution Primitives: Windows API Abuse

The core malicious action is revealed by the declaration and intended use of three low level Windows Native API functions. This proves intent to execute arbitrary machine code.

Function (Original)VBA AliasLibraryPurpose in Attack Chain
NtAllocateVirtualMemorylijlJliiiLIijILLntdllAllocates memory in the Excel process and marks it as executable (RWX), enabling shellcode execution.
WideCharToMultiByteilJIJlJIiJJLillJkernel32Used to copy the raw shellcode from the VBA variable into the newly allocated executable memory region.
Internal_EnumUILanguagesllJJIlJILlllljiLkernelbaseAbused to transfer execution by passing the shellcode address as a callback, causing the OS to execute the malicious code.

Shellcode Payload Analysis


Execution Flow: The VBA subroutine first allocates the executable memory, then copies the jijjLLlLiLJLlJli array into it, and finally triggers execution via the abused Internal_EnumUILanguages function.
PostExecution Action: The shellcode (the first stage payload) is not fully deobfuscated in the static analysis, but based on the TTPs of Donot APT, its function is certain: to establish a foothold by downloading, decrypting, and executing a more permanent, custom secondary payload (like YTY or GEdit) and setting up Command and Control (C2) communication for data exfiltration and persistent surveillance.

Conclusion and Next Steps

This Excel file is a highly evasive and unequivocally malicious dropper designed to facilitate state sponsored cyber espionage.

Donot APT uses memory. Contact us to find what others miss.

Keep reading

Related research

Daxin Rootkit
Threat ReportsTLP:AMBER

Daxin Returns: A 13-Year-Old China-Linked Rootkit That Never Called Home

Symantec found the Daxin kernel rootkit still operational on a Taiwan manufacturing subsidiary in 2026, alongside a previously undocumented backdoor, Stupig, that runs SYSTEM commands from the Windows logon screen before anyone signs in.

6 min readAPT

Contact

Talk to someone who has seen this before.

You speak directly to the people doing the work, wherever in the world you operate.

Or email [email protected]